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IntroductIon
Since the late nineteenth century the media in 
Turkey has been characterised by state inter-
vention, which has intensified during times 
of political crisis and upheaval. For this 
reason, the media has often been in conflict 
with the state; state officials have censored 
and attempted to control media content in 
various ways when it has not complied with 
official ideology. In the last two decades, 
state intervention of the media has taken on a 
transnational aspect: the state has deployed 
various diplomatic and other strategies, par-
ticularly targeted at the Kurdish media, in 
order to control any alternative discourse on 
the Kurdish question (Sinclair and Smets, 
2014). Following the attempted coup of 15 
July 2016, the Turkish government imposed 
severe restrictions on the media, closing 
down television channels, imprisoning jour-
nalists, and confiscating the property and 
materials of several media organisations. The 
operations of the Alevi television channels, 
Yol TV and TV10, which broadcast from 
Germany and Turkey and appeal to the trans-
national Alevi community living in Europe 
and Turkey, were also closed down. However, 
the Alevi television stations turned to alterna-
tive means to keep in touch with their audi-
ence and found different ways to survive in 
resistance to the government’s measures. 
Drawing on interviews conducted with tele-
vision producers and executives in Germany, 
this chapter focuses on the survival strategies 
of Alevi television at a time of growing state 
authoritarianism in Turkey.
The failed coup attempt in July 2016, the 
latest in a series of military coups (some 
successful) in Turkey, has challenged and 
transformed media culture and institutions 
in various ways. Even though it is a com-
plex transformation, difficult to analyse thor-
oughly at this current moment, one can draw 
on certain measures taken against the media 
as a point of departure for an analysis. At the 
time of writing this chapter (October 2018), 
149 journalists have been arrested (‘144 
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Gazeteci ve Calisan Cezaevinde’, 2018) and 
over a hundred television stations and news-
papers closed down, usually overnight, under 
decree laws suddenly announced by the gov-
ernment. The attempted coup has resulted in 
a deep rift between the Gülenist organisation 
(an Islamic order which has been accused of 
wishing to achieve political power through 
infiltrating government organisations; see 
Tittensor, 2014) and the ruling Justice and 
Development Party (AKP). However, the 
government’s rapid and brutal response to 
the coup has reached beyond the Gülenist 
organisation, which supposedly organised 
the coup attempt, to target various sections 
of Turkish society, particularly oppositional 
groups and communities such as Kurds and 
Alevis. Located within the Turkish context, 
the Alevi channels are part of a diverse alter-
native media environment that has suffered 
the consequences of the increased authoritar-
ianism that followed the recent coup attempt.
Until 1989 the Turkish media had been 
monovocal, with only public radio and televi-
sion available, which were strictly controlled 
by the state and operated as a means of dis-
seminating and legitimising the state ideology 
(Adakli, 2009). The introduction of private 
broadcasting in the 1990s provided relative 
autonomy from the state’s official discourses 
and cultural policies which allowed popular 
culture to flourish more ‘freely’ in the con-
text of media regulation that was now guided 
by neoliberal economic policies (Adakli, 
2009). However, despite a greater integration 
of Turkish popular culture with the culture of 
the global media though music video clips 
and new forms of television entertainment, 
private radio and television broadcasting 
could still not transgress the ‘red lines’ of the 
official ideology over certain issues, such as 
the Kurdish question. In that regard, authori-
tarianism did not arise purely as a result of 
the attempted coup but has been a charac-
teristic that has defined the Turkish media 
market, complemented by neoliberal poli-
cies, for some time, particularly during the 
period of the AKP (Yesil, 2016). The coup 
attempt, however, provided legitimacy for 
more restrictive measures against the media, 
which has helped the AKP government to re-
consolidate its power in the media sphere.
AlevI televIsIon In the 
trAnsnAtIonAl context
Alevis are the second largest religious group 
in Turkey and have suffered persecution on 
and off since the sixteenth century. Even 
today they are not recognised in Turkey as a 
separate religious group despite their ongo-
ing demands to be so (Soekefeld, 2008; 
White and Jongerden, 2003). For a variety of 
reasons, including economic and cultural 
ones, Alevis over the last century left Turkey 
and migrated to Europe. As a result, vibrant 
Alevi communities can be found across 
Europe, with between 400,000 and 600,000 
in Germany (Massicard, 2010) and 300,000 
in the UK (‘Who are we?’, 2018). The migra-
tion of Alevis to Europe has had significant 
implications for the emergence and scope of 
transnational Alevi politics, particularly as it 
has been a major factor in what has come to 
be known as the ‘Alevi revival’ (Soekefeld, 
2008). Following the massacre of Alevis in 
1993, known as the Sivas Massacre, Alevis 
mobilised and started to organise as federa-
tions in Europe, which has had powerful 
consequences for Alevis back in Turkey 
(Massicard, 2012; Soekefeld, 2008; White 
and Jongerden, 2003). One of the conse-
quences of this mobilisation around Alevi 
identity has been the emergence of Alevi 
television and, since the early 2000s, the 
establishment of various television channels 
operating via satellite. It is important to note 
that these types of media outlet reflect the 
oppositional political spectrum in Turkey 
rather than simply offering an alternative to 
the mainstream media. This trend started 
with MED TV, the first Kurdish television 
channel, established in 1995, which gave 
voice to the Partiye Karkeren Kurdistan 
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(PKK) at a transnational level (Hassanpour, 
1998, 2003).
The Alevi television stations include TV 
Avrupa (based in Germany), Dem TV (based 
in the UK), Su TV (based in Germany and 
later in France), Duzgun TV (based in 
Germany), Kanal 12 (based in Germany), 
Cem TV (based in Turkey), Yol TV (based 
in Germany and later in Turkey), and TV 
10 (based in Germany and in Turkey) (Emre 
Cetin, 2018b). Three of them – Cem TV, 
TV10, and Yol TV – were on air before 
the attempted coup in July 2016. After the 
coup attempt, TV10 was closed down in 
September 2016 by a decree under the gov-
ernment’s state of emergency and Yol TV’s 
broadcasting was suspended in December 
2016 by the Radio and Television Supreme 
Council (RTUK) on the grounds of insult-
ing the President, praising terrorist organi-
sations, and broadcasting without a Turkish 
license. Cem TV remained in operation from 
its base in Turkey, while TV10 and Yol TV 
broadcast on the internet only, mainly from 
Europe (Emre Cetin, 2018a: 2). Recently, Yol 
TV came on air through the Astra satellite, 
and another television station, Can TV, which 
is the successor of TV10, was established, 
and broadcast through the Eurosat-Hotbird 
satellite.
The closure of Yol TV and TV10 led 
them to seek alternative means to reach their 
audience. At the same time, while explor-
ing legal options and campaigning against 
their closure, both television stations con-
tinued online streaming through their own 
websites and made preparations to continue 
broadcasting in a way which enabled them 
to minimise state intervention. This chapter 
focuses on this time period. In this regard, 
it is important to note that my research on 
Alevi television is bound by the context of 
closure and online streaming, which has vari-
ous implications for production and viewing 
practices. However, it must be appreciated 
that although these television stations had to 
go online, they remained television channels 
that were using this means of transmission 
only as a temporary replacement for their 
suspended services, and they have recently 
started broadcasting through satellite again.
Currently, Alevi television is situated at 
the intersection of various media catego-
ries which deserve a detailed discussion but 
which are beyond the scope of this chapter. 
However, it is useful to briefly point out what 
these categories are and how Alevi televi-
sion fits into them. According to Matsaganis, 
Katz, and Ball-Rokeach, ‘Ethnic media 
are media that are produced by and for  
(a) immigrants, (b) racial, ethnic, and lin-
guistic minorities, as well as (c) indigenous 
populations living across different countries’ 
(2011: 6). Therefore, as the media of the 
ethno- religious and immigrant community of 
Alevis, Alevi television can be regarded as an 
ethnic media. However, the way that Alevis 
have been politicised through their connec-
tion to leftist and Kurdish politics in Turkey 
since the 1970s (Massicard, 2012; Soekefeld, 
2008) has led Alevi television to actively 
engage in broader political issues beyond 
Alevism. In this regard, Alevi television can 
be considered as an alternative media as it 
campaigns for a ‘radical social change’ that 
attempts to create a collectivist form of media 
production in a democratic way (O’Sullivan, 
2004: 10). It can also be argued that Alevi tel-
evision is a form of ‘citizen’s media’ because 
of its commitment to the values of diversity, 
leftist understanding and social progress 
(Rodriguez, 2001, 2011; Waltz, 2005:4).
Both Yol TV (2006) and TV10 (2011) 
have been based in Germany as well as 
Turkey. While the executives of TV10 
mention that the channel’s main office is 
in Turkey, Yol TV is led from the office in 
Germany, explained by the fact that Yol TV 
is owned on behalf of the European Alevi 
Confederation, whereas TV10 is owned by 
private individuals. Alevi television stations 
are transnational, both in the sense that they 
are based in different countries and have rep-
resentatives in many others and in the sense 
that their programme content and audience 
have a strong transnational dimension which 
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cannot be reduced to a simple two-way 
relationship between Alevis in Germany 
and Turkey. That is to say, the channels go 
beyond just helping the diasporic Alevi com-
munity keep up with developments in the 
home country and community (Georgiou, 
2001; Matsaganis et al. 2011: 64). They also 
provide a means to mobilise the Alevi com-
munity around Turkish and Alevi politics at 
a transnational level. The location of these 
channels, their network coverage (which has 
also changed as these channels no longer 
rely on the Turkish satellite Turksat), their 
programme content, which encompasses a 
variety of programmes with local, national, 
and transnational scope, and the relationship 
between the offices located in Germany and 
Turkey reflect the complexities of the trans-
national Alevi network.
While the closure of Alevi television 
channels is without doubt part of a broader 
attack on the media and freedom of speech 
by the Turkish government, given the history 
of Alevi repression, the blackout of Alevi 
television can also be seen as part of a policy 
of communicative ethnocide by the Turkish 
state. As I argue elsewhere, the silencing of 
the Alevi media can be regarded as aimed 
at destroying the communicative means 
and capacity of the Alevi community, with 
the ultimate goal of interrupting and even-
tually annihilating its cultural formation 
(Emre Cetin, 2018a: 8). Clastres argues that 
ethnocide is the ‘systematic destruction of 
ways of living and thinking of people from 
those who lead this venture of destruction’ 
(2010: 103). While genocide persecutes the 
members of a particular community, eth-
nocide destroys the culture, aiming to bring 
about the cultural death of the community. 
Therefore, communicative ethnocide is not 
simply about censoring or obstructing the 
use of media by and for the communities; 
instead it is part of a sophisticated process 
of silencing a community and cannot be 
fully understood without an understanding 
of the particular history and the context of 
that community.
I argue that Alevi television has emerged 
as a resistance to this communicative eth-
nocide, a resistance that has taken a differ-
ent direction following the coup attempt, as 
the Turkish government seeks to advance 
the measures of ethnocide in the context 
of the state of emergency. Furthermore, 
I argue that communicative ethnocide must 
be regarded as a form of conflict, which 
is aimed at the elimination of particular 
groups through the use of different forms 
of violence, including symbolic violence. 
Following this point, I suggest that the 
definition of conflict within the media lit-
erature must be expanded to encompass the 
use of communicative processes, including 
symbolic destruction, aimed at a commu-
nity’s demise through the destruction of its 
media, and that community’s response to 
the attempted destruction.
This chapter draws primarily on data 
gathered from 14 in-depth interviews, which 
were completed in 2017 with the workers, 
executives, and producers of Alevi televi-
sion and are part of a broader project on 
transnational Alevi citizenship and media. 
The project focuses on the role of Alevi 
television in constructing and mobilising 
Alevi citizenship in a transnational context 
and more broadly addresses the relationship 
between old and new forms of media in citi-
zenship practices. The in-depth interviews 
were transcribed and thematically catego-
rised and then subjected to critical discourse 
analysis to identify how my interviewees 
define Alevism and Alevi politics, what they 
consider the role of Alevi television to be for 
the Alevi community, and how they see their 
role in working for Alevi television. In addi-
tion, I am currently conducting an ongoing 
ethnographic study of the Alevi commu-
nity in London that focuses on Alevi civic- 
participation practices and the conceptions 
of citizenship with reference to the media 
and Alevi television in particular. For the 
purpose of this chapter, the primary focus is 
on the Alevi television workers’ accounts of 
the closures.
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MedIAtIsed conflIct And 
MedIAtIsed resIstAnce
The literature on media and conflict has 
largely evolved around considerations of 
armed conflict, media representations, and the 
media’s role in conflict resolution (Allen and 
Seaton, 1999; Robinson et al., 2017; Wolfsfled, 
1997). This is highly relevant, given the fact 
that, according to the Institute for Economics 
and Peace and Global Peace Index, there are 
conflicts in some form or another in 185 out of 
195 countries (Oleyele, 2017: 21). While the 
mainstream media is a significant point of 
reference for the general public, ethnic, alter-
native, and diasporic media also play an 
important role, especially for the communities 
who are themselves involved in the conflict, 
something which is often neglected. As 
Ogunyemi argues, it is pertinent to understand 
the role played by the diasporic media ‘in 
escalating or deescalating conflict, their 
appropriation of journalistic norms, and their 
engagement with audiences to mediate con-
flicts’ (2017: 1). Despite its importance, the 
relationship between diasporic and ethnic 
media and conflict, where communities can 
develop, disseminate, and even gain accept-
ance for their perspectives, remains an under-
researched area (Keles, 2015; Osman, 2015; 
Smets, 2016, 2018; Tsavkko Garcia, 2018).
Cottle (2006: 8–9) suggests using the term 
‘mediatized conflict’ in theorising the com-
plexities of the relationship between media 
and conflict, as it emphasises ‘the complex 
ways in which media are often implicated 
within conflicts while disseminating ideas and 
images about them’ and stresses the active 
and performative role of media in enacting, 
performing, reporting, and representing con-
flict. The idea of mediatised conflict enables 
us to see media as a significant actor in pro-
ducing, reproducing, and dissolving conflict. 
At this point, it is important to emphasise 
that the notion of mediatised conflict applies 
to all sections of the media, including ‘non-
mainstream’ media (no matter whether we 
call it alternative, diasporic, or ethnic), despite 
the tendency to confine it to the mainstream, 
as it plays a key role in mediatising conflict 
not only by providing alternative representa-
tions of the conflict but also by mobilising 
the audience around certain political options. 
Again, the Kurdish media and Alevi television 
exemplify this in the Turkish context. Despite 
the fact that their influence is limited by the 
number of their viewers, diasporic, ethnic, and 
alternative media are still powerful actors in 
defining the extent of the conflict for their own 
publics by either escalating or de-escalating its 
significance. They also draw the boundaries 
of the discourse of conflict for their viewers, 
both visually and verbally, by circulating par-
ticular images of the conflict, such as massa-
cres and armed conflicts and/or discussing the 
conflict in particular ways that act as counter- 
definitions to those in the mainstream media.
There are various ethnic, religious, and polit-
ical groups that position themselves in terms 
of their conflict with those who hold politi-
cal power and/or there are states and govern-
ments who adopt conflict as a policy towards 
such groups. In the case of the Alevis (and 
Kurds), conflict – in this case with the state, 
whether armed or not – has been key for the 
self- definitions of these communities and can-
not be eradicated from their identities in the 
media. During the current state of emergency, 
where the government of the ruling AKP has 
adopted strict measures against oppositional 
views in the media, this conflict has taken a 
different turn, and it is this which forms the 
subject of this chapter. I shall examine the self- 
perceptions that Alevis have of their identity 
in relation to their conflict with the state in the 
context of television and the ways in which they 
offer resistance through online technologies.
AlevI televIsIon As resIstAnce
In this section I shall argue that Alevi televi-
sion has emerged as a form of resistance 
against the attempted suppression of Alevi 
identity by the state and examine how Alevis 
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have reconstructed themselves as a ‘media-
tised community’ through television. This 
resistance is twofold: resistance against 
mainstream media practices and its represen-
tation regime, and resistance against the 
state’s policies towards (against) Alevis. 
Research on alternative media clearly shows 
that those who are involved in the production 
process mostly consider their role in the 
media to be a form of resistance to the main-
stream and a social struggle against it 
(Peschanski, 2007). They also consider it an 
alternative field of production (Atton, 2002: 
29) despite their limited power in democra-
tising the media environment, and a way of 
empowering the minority’s struggle for rec-
ognition (Bailey et al., 2008). Those involved 
in Alevi television are no exception. Salih is 
an experienced producer who has been part 
of TV10 since the beginning. His account not 
only demonstrates that Alevi media profes-
sionals have to render themselves invisible 
within the mainstream media environment: it 
also shows that this exclusion has mobilised 
them to create new means for themselves:
The main reason why we established a television 
channel is because the mainstream media has 
turned a blind-eye towards Alevis. They want us to 
take part, they offered us to go and work with 
them. They said come and work with us but leave 
Alevism behind. You come and work but your 
Alevism can’t come. […]. This is their perspective 
on Alevis; that’s why you look for a channel where 
you can express yourself. This is the aim of our 
channels.1 (Salih, TV10)
Rather than just being concerned with the 
misrepresentation of Alevism, Salih com-
plains about the invisibility of Alevis and the 
lack of an Alevi perspective when Alevi ques-
tions are discussed on mainstream television. 
Salih’s account also points to the ‘desired’ 
profile required of a media professional from 
which her/his ethno-religious identity must 
be eliminated if they wish to be part of the 
mainstream media system. This denial of 
the existence of an ethno-religious identity 
other than that approved by the state indicates 
how the state’s ethnocide policies have 
repercussions for the media market and its 
values. According to Taylor, ‘Nonrecognition 
or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a 
form of oppression, imprisoning someone in 
a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being’ 
(1994: 25). In this regard, the attempt by 
Alevis to express themselves on and through 
television can be seen as a form of resistance 
against this form of oppression, framed by the 
nonrecognition and misrecognition of partic-
ular identities. Of course, this is not specific 
to Alevis but is relevant to other groups who 
engage their media practices with human 
rights movements and/or identity politics. 
However, what marks out Alevi television is 
its ability to establish connections between the 
local, national, and transnational, even instan-
taneously. For instance, Alevi television played 
a key role in mobilising Alevis in Turkey and 
Europe during the attacks targeted against 
Alevi families and individuals living in differ-
ent parts of Turkey.
Oya, who has been involved in the 
Germany Alevi Federation for over a dec-
ade and has produced and presented differ-
ent programmes for Yol TV, describes how 
television has given voice to Alevis and 
enhanced their resistance to the suppression 
of their identity. She argues that television is 
a must for Alevi identity politics:
Of course television is very important. […] It is 
crucial for you to express yourself, explain yourself 
to others and present the problems faced by an 
oppositional peoples. […] In order to express 
these, be the voice of the voiceless, television is 
very important for us, especially for conveying the 
achievements of the European Alevis to Turkey… 
That’s why Yol TV is a must for us. Our struggle will 
continue [against the closure] either through the 
internet [online streaming] or through other sys-
tems. (Oya, Yol TV)
Like many Alevis, Oya considers Alevis as 
part of oppositional groups in Turkey (that is, 
in opposition to the group in power) and 
regards Alevi television as not only the voice 
of Alevis but also as ‘the voice of the voice-
less’, those who are invisible in the main-
stream Turkish media that only echoes the 
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policies of the AKP government. In this 
regard, Alevi television is positioned against 
the mainstream Turkish media and within the 
‘other’ stream, which resists the main-
stream’s discourse defined by Turkishness 
and Sunni Islam. At this point it is important 
to highlight that this view of Alevi television 
is shared by the viewers in the UK whom I 
interviewed and the Alevis with whom I had 
informal discussions in Turkey, for, despite 
any criticisms of Alevi television channels, 
its viewers feel that they are empowered by 
its existence.
The producers and decision-makers of 
Alevi television who are individual activists 
or activists involved in Alevi organisations 
consider their practices as a form of politi-
cal activism, which, by creating a ‘common 
sense’ – that is, a shared sentiment among 
Alevis about being Alevi – not only chal-
lenges mainstream media practices but also 
challenges state policies towards Alevis. 
Halit is a well-known political commentator 
who has been involved in the Kurdish move-
ment for years. While making a comparison 
between Kurdish and Alevi movements he 
argues that:
Television is quite important in terms of nationali-
sation.2 […] Alevism was more local, so attacks 
against Alevis and the reactions against those 
attacks remained local. Even if it was made 
national, it was made national through Kurdish 
politics or the left or the Republican People’s Party 
not through Alevi [identity] politics. […] Rather 
than Alevis hiding themselves in their localities, 
they became national. This was a need and televi-
sion had to reflect it. (Halit, TV10)
According to Halit, Alevi television has 
served as a significant tool for Alevis, allow-
ing them to express themselves and to be 
connected, thereby creating a common Alevi 
identity similar to a national one. Halit’s 
description has many points of resemblance 
with Anderson’s (1991) notion of ‘imagined 
communities’, where the print media not 
only creates a common agenda for those who 
are bound by the same national boundaries 
but also a ‘common sense’. In the case of an 
Alevi ‘imagined community’, there is no 
doubt that television has helped to construct 
an alternative public, but rather than simply 
being on a national scale it has become a 
transnational one. Some caution, however, is 
required not to overstate the role of television 
in the making of this transnational alternative 
public of Alevis, since they have been organ-
ising in European countries for more than 
three decades. But television has added the 
dimension of instantaneity and expanded the 
vision of connectedness by enabling dynamic 
links between the local, national, and trans-
national and by creating a transnational 
imagination (Emre Cetin, 2018b).
My interviewees also emphasised the role 
Alevi television broadcasting from Europe 
has played in Turkey. Despite the fears sur-
rounding the overt expression of Alevi iden-
tity in Turkey, the example set by European 
Alevi organisations as presented through 
Alevi television, as Oya and Vedat empha-
sise, has been important in empowering those 
living in Turkey and has acted as a facilitator 
in recruiting more Alevis to Alevi organisa-
tions. Furthermore, having television chan-
nels in which Alevis are in control of the 
ways in which they are represented, as well 
as having the ability to address the broader 
community, has helped them to gain confi-
dence and come forward as Alevis:
First of all television enabled the communication 
between Alevis in Turkey and Alevis in Europe and 
to keep up with each other being their voice. 
Secondly […] the mobilisation we created through 
television when we go to Turkey, when we broad-
cast the memorial events of the Alevi massacres, 
encouraged the expansion of Alevi recruitment in 
Turkey. […] Alevis living in villages and in cities [in 
Turkey] gained a self-confidence. (Vedat, Yol TV)
My interviewees’ accounts in this chapter 
demonstrate how the workers on Alevi televi-
sion channels consider their role as vital to 
Alevi politics – not only because many 
actively take part in the Alevi movement but 
because of their confidence in arguing how 
this is based on the feedback they receive 
from their audience. Their hands-on approach 
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to television broadcasting enables them to 
receive face-to-face, lively comments and 
criticisms from the viewers about the pro-
grammes and their approach to Alevi poli-
tics. This is also evident in their programmes 
on Alevi events in Turkey and Europe or those 
where they visit Alevi villages in Turkey. No 
doubt, one can also argue that their commit-
ment and idealism may lead them to overes-
timate the role that they play in Alevi politics 
as broadcasters; however, the viewers’ 
endorsement of Alevi television and the 
way the Turkish state seeks to silence these 
channels suggest the opposite.
dIgItAl resIstAnce: IPtv  
And onlIne streAMIng
After the attempted coup, the increasing 
pressure on those journalists and media pro-
fessionals targeted by the Turkish govern-
ment led them to use online services as a 
means of broadcasting. Currently, social 
media accounts, live video streaming ser-
vices such as Periscope, and video on-
demand services such as YouTube operate as 
platforms to reach alternative publics in the 
suppressed media environment of Turkey. 
Both Yol TV and TV10 have benefited from 
broadcasting online after their closure in 
Turkey. While both of these channels have 
relied on online streaming, Yol TV has used 
IPTV3 in order to make itself available 
through smart-television sets and computers. 
In this regard, the closing of Alevi television 
channels has resulted in expanding online 
potential for Alevi broadcasts:
Broadcasting [online streaming] continues thanks 
to the technical infrastructure we have here in 
Europe. This is nothing like we had on Turksat 
[satellite] of course. […] Currently our programmes 
are more suited to the logic of online streaming, 
shorter, less focused, conveying short messages to 
the society. […] We have our viewers, we receive 
feedback and it [streaming] is more or less effec-
tive. (Salih, TV10)
However, in the contemporary Turkish con-
text, online streaming does not necessarily 
mean being more accessible and free from 
pressure. Even though Salih adopts an opti-
mistic tone with regard to online streaming 
and the potential for social media, the major-
ity of my interviewees are pessimistic about 
going online. They emphasise that a big 
potential has been lost, as they observe their 
number of viewers dropping significantly 
after starting online streaming. This is pri-
marily a result of the audience profile for 
these channels. According to my interview-
ees who work in Alevi television channels, 
the average viewer profile of Yol TV and 
TV10 is a middle-aged Alevi from either 
an urban or rural backgrounds with limited 
digital literacy and digital skills. Hence, the 
average viewer is less able and less willing to 
follow these channels compared to the situa-
tion before their closure.
Despite these limitations, it is important 
to acknowledge the transnational character 
of this online resistance. As one interviewee 
states, online streaming is possible thanks to 
the infrastructure and human resources avail-
able in Germany. Recently, a new channel, 
Can TV, which can be regarded as the suc-
cessor of TV10, has been established, again 
in Germany. This demonstrates that the Alevi 
media is responding at a transnational level 
to the pressures originating from the national 
context. Since the goods and materials 
owned by TV10 in Turkey have been confis-
cated by the government under the state-of- 
emergency law, TV10 has had to rely solely 
on its resources in Germany. Thus, resistance 
is not only taking place at the symbolic level 
but also at the economic one, and those Alevi 
channels that still have resources in Turkey 
have to be very careful to preserve and use 
them. These television channels do not rely 
solely on digital media for survival: they 
employ various strategies that include trans-
ferring human resources in Turkey for use on 
documentary projects on Alevism (TV10), 
seeking alternatives to the Turksat satellite, 
which is controlled by Turkey (Yol TV), 
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and campaigning for their right to broadcast 
(Emre Cetin, 2018a). Nevertheless, online 
streaming and IPTV have been crucial in 
maintaining audience engagement (albeit at 
a reduced level) as well as demonstrating that 
Alevi channels are committed to the ‘Alevi 
cause’ despite the pressures. That is why cur-
rently Alevi television operates as an impor-
tant tool for the resistance of Alevis.
conclusIon
Despite the growing emphases on online 
diasporic communities, my research demon-
strates that television is still a significant 
medium for transnational communities who 
struggle for political and cultural recogni-
tion. The cases of Yol TV and TV10 indicate 
certain strategies employed by broadcasters, 
such as switching to online streaming and 
IPTV, despite the drop in the audience inter-
est and engagement. These cases also con-
firm that it is more difficult for the political 
authorities to control online streaming than 
satellite broadcasting, which allows commu-
nities to employ their digital resources as a 
counter-strategy during times of authoritari-
anism and increasing oppression. However, 
the fruitfulness of this strategy is highly dis-
puted, since having digital resources does not 
eliminate existing digital inequalities and 
access to internet and digital literacy. In this 
regard, online streaming is far from being a 
long-term solution for digitally marginalised 
communities such as Alevis. Furthermore, 
the digital sphere is not free from political 
pressure. At the time of writing this chapter, 
the Turkish government has introduced 
measures to exert a broader control of the 
internet, and the Turkish Parliament has 
recently passed a bill allowing the radio and 
television regulator, RTUK, to control online 
streaming content.
In this chapter, I have demonstrated that 
Alevi television cannot be compartmental-
ised into the category of diasporic media: it 
articulates the complexities of transnational 
networks and reconstructs them in particu-
lar ways despite the challenges posed by 
the Turkish national political agenda. The 
Alevi case indicates that television is still 
an important tool of resistance for margin-
alised communities against state oppression. 
It also emphasises the necessity of situating 
the relationship between traditional and digi-
tal media in a complex media ecology where 
transnational communities turn towards dif-
ferent media and different uses. The clo-
sure of the Alevi television channels and 
their re-opening through different satellites, 
which redefines their geographical scope, 
demonstrates the powerful influence of the 
national context in the home country on the 
transnational community’s communicative 
practices.4
Notes
1 All interviews were conducted in Turkish and the 
quotes have been translated by the author.
2 The interviewee here is referring to the idea that 
Alevis start to feel connected at the national level 
rather being isolated in their own localities.
3 Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) is the streaming 
of television content online, enabling viewers to 
watch television content either on their sets or on 
their computers immediately.
4 Further analysis of the ethnographic data and 
the yet to be analysed audience data will shed 
further light on the different generational media 
practices and their implications for resistance and 
identity politics.
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